The Neural Systems that Respond to Emotional Stimuli with Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Significance by de Rojas, Joaquin Octavio
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/691
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2009
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
The Neural Systems that Respond to
Emotional Stimuli with Phylogenetic and
Ontogenetic Signiﬁcance
Author: Joaquin Octavio de Rojas
Phylogenetic vs. Ontogenetic Emotion 
 
1 
Running Head: PHYLOGENTIC VS. ONTOGENETIC EMOTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Neural Systems that Respond to Emotional Stimuli with Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic 
Significance 
 
Joaquin de Rojas 
 
Boston College 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phylogenetic vs. Ontogenetic Emotion 
 
2 
Abstract 
Neural and behavioral responses to emotional stimuli often are discussed within an 
evolutionary framework.  Although some of the information that elicits an emotional response is 
likely to have had evolutionary significance (e.g., snakes, spiders), many other stimuli would not 
have been evolutionarily relevant (e.g., guns, grenades).  The present study re-analyzed data 
from two fMRI studies (Kensinger et al., 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008) to examine whether 
the neural systems that respond to emotional stimuli differ depending upon whether those stimuli 
were of phylogenetic or ontogenetic significance.  The results revealed that when stimuli were 
ontogenetic, activity was increased in regions of the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices.  
By contrast, when stimuli were phylogenetic, activity was increased in a region spanning the 
lingual and fusiform gyri.  These results suggest that there can be differences in how emotional 
stimuli are processed, and those differences can depend upon the stimuli’s evolutionary 
significance. 
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Introduction 
The debate of nature versus nurture has pervaded human social thought for centuries.  
Are we born “blank slates,” ready to be illustrated by the paintbrushes of our experience (the 
nurture view), or are we born with a certain genetic predetermination (the nature view)?  It is 
now understood that both nature and nurture views, in their pure forms, are too simplistic.  To 
what could have been the dismay of B.F. Skinner and others, behaviorist approaches cannot 
condition dogs to talk and, at the same time, hyperbolic Darwinism is inadequate at explaining 
how dogs will salivate at the conditioned ringing of a bell (Bear, Connors & Paradiso, 2001)  As 
it turns out, nature works in concert with nurture, and not against it; genes may set up the initial 
brain hardwiring, but that wiring is continuously reconfigured, and oftentimes drastically, by the 
individual’s experiences and environment – a concept known as “plasticity” (Bear et al., 2001) 
Furthermore, experiences in the environment can bring about the expression or suppression of 
certain genes that alter neural systems.  This concept of “nature via nurture” (Ridley, 2003) has 
prompted some psychologists and neuroscientists to compare and contrast behavioral and 
cognitive phenomena that have innate or “phylogenetic” origins against those phenomena whose 
origins are developmental or “ontogenetic” (Mühlberger, Wiedemann, Herrmann, & Pauli, 
2006).  This study will take a look at the human brain’s response to stimuli that elicit fear or 
positive emotion, in an attempt to better understand whether phylogenetic fear, or emotion in 
general, has a different functional neuroanatomic representation than its ontogenetic counterpart.   
Emotion is a complex multidimensional concept with inherent perceptual, expressive, and 
subjective components that make its definition and presence hard to pin down.  For the purposes 
of this paper, I will define emotion as a feeling that arises from an encounter with a particular 
stimulus and which is associated by a physiological change. I have chosen this particular 
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phenomenon as a point of investigation since it is so central and omnipresent in human life and 
culture, defining the human experience in general and drastically and differentially affecting the 
lives of all.  Secondly, I have chosen to investigate the neuroanatomical disparities of 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically originating emotions since doing so may provide some 
insight on the neuroscience of certain phobia disorders by elucidating those brain regions and 
circuits which are most correlated with ontogenetic fears, and thus, perhaps most likely to 
“rewire” as a result of cognitive-behavioral and psychoactive drug therapy.  Finally, it is 
important to acknowledge the validity of investigating the group neurocorrelates of emotion 
before such a feat is undertaken.   
Human and nonhuman emotional reactions are complex in part because they can be 
attributed to various environmental or ontogenetic factors.  Emotional reactions can stem from 
associative learning, or conditioning: this includes a particular stimulus or context (group of 
stimuli presented in a particular pattern) eliciting an emotional and physiological response 
because of previous pairings of that stimulus or context with other valence-relevant (aversive or 
pleasurable) stimuli or contexts.  This explanation implies that everything that a person or animal 
likes or dislikes can be thought of as stemming from previous likes and dislikes – a phenomenon 
known as “evaluative conditioning” (De Houwer, Thomas & Baeyens, 2001).  As every animal’s 
life experience includes a multitude of drastically different conditioning events of varying 
relevance to that animal, one can see how every animal’s ontogenetic emotional experience will 
be considerably unique and complex.   
Although animals go through life uniquely shaped by and shaping their emotional 
experiences, significant emotional congruity does appear to exist within each species.  For 
instance, monkeys and human infants will startle at the sight of snake even if they have never 
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before seen one (DeLoache & LoBue, 2008).  The physical or behavioral manifestations of 
emotion such as smiling, frowning, laughing, and crying are identical across all cultures and are 
even apparent in unlikely populations such as people born blind (Prohovnik, Skudlarski, 
Fullbright, Gore, & Wexler, 2004).  These studies support the notion that although emotions may 
show a degree of inconsistency in origin and subjective experience amongst different people, 
there may be a shared phylogenetic basis to their perception and expression.  
In this study, previously acquired functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data 
was used to determine how activation pathways differ when subjects are presented with 
ontogenetic fear relevant (FR) and positive-emotion relevant (PR) stimuli as conditioned and 
communicated through culture – such as guns, knives, or car accidents to exemplify the former 
and celebratory scenes exempt of happy faces to exemplify the latter – versus when they are 
presented with phylogenetic FR stimuli -- such as snakes, fires, sharks, lions (Roach, 2001) -- 
and phylogenetic PR stimuli -- such as smiling newborn babies and happy faces in general.       
Contrasting activation in response to phylogenetic versus ontogenetic FR stimuli is of 
particular importance since fear, and disorders resulting from the dysregulation of fear, have 
been frequently associated with evolutionary underpinnings (Mühlberger et al., 2006).  This 
suggests that the stress and avoidance response of fear has the clearest repercussions for “fitness” 
(Freeman, 2008) or the survival and reproduction of one’s genes. 
In addition, PR stimuli will be grouped together with FR stimuli to acquire a less fear 
biased representation of phylogenetic versus ontogenetic emotional-relevant stimuli.  Unlike 
fear, however, positive emotion does not have as clear cut ties to fitness unless it is presented in 
the context of pleasure or positive interpersonal feelings that lead to survival, reproduction, kin 
selection, or the collective fitness of a population (Freeman, 2008; Goetze, 2007).   
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Since the experience of fear may have clearer ties to fitness, phylogenetic FR stimuli may 
grab attention and stimulate sensory regions better than phylogenetic PR stimuli, leading to a 
larger phylogenetic/ontogenetic discrepancy for FR rather than PR stimuli.  One experiment 
highlights how nonanxious participants are quicker to detect a threatening face amongst a crowd 
of friendly and neutral faces (Ohman & Mineka, 2001), although another study has refuted this 
(Elaine, Laura & Elias, 2008).     
On another note, animal studies have suggested that there may be important distinctions 
between responses to phylogenetic and ontogenetic stimuli. For example, rats are born with fight 
or flight mechanisms triggered by odors of predators (innate or phylogenetic) as well as to odors 
which the animal has learned to associate with harmful objects or organisms (learned or 
ontogenetic).   The odors leading to an innate fear response seem to trigger similar behaviors as 
the odors leading to a learned or ontogenetic fear response.  But although the behavioral 
manifestations may be similar, the neurological mechanisms have been shown to be 
fundamentally different. For example, a lesion study of the mouse olfactory lobe has shown that 
glomerular structures that respond to unconditioned odors and lead to an innate fear responses 
are found in different areas from those glomerular structures which respond to conditioned FR 
stimuli (Kobayakawa, 2007). Another study found that specific neural systems which respond to 
Pavlovian conditioned fears, such as those that influence the muscle freeze effect in a rat before 
an impending electric shock, differed from those that respond to phylogenetic fears of predators 
primarily in that they included more prefrontal cortex regions (Canteras, 2003).  Different nuclei 
of the amygdala also have been implicated in innate versus learned fear responses; rats with 
lesions to the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala often fail to acquire learned fear responses, but 
they will demonstrate a normal response to stimuli that elicit innate fear, such as a cat 
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(Thompson, Sullivan & Wilson, 2008).  Another study has implicated the anterior cingulate 
cortex (aCC), part of the prefrontal cortex, and its connections to the basolateral amygdala as 
essential for emotional, effort-based decision making (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007) 
 These studies suggest that fear elicited via phylogenetic versus ontogenetic means rely on 
different neural circuitry in nonhuman animals.  Various human studies, too, have implicated the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), aCC, and other frontal regions with emotional conditioning and 
associative learning (Alvarez, Briggs, Chen & Pine, 2008; Damasio, 1994; Davidson, Putnam & 
Larson, 2000; Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Haber, Kim, Mailly, & Calzavara, 2006; Milad, 
Quirk, Orr, Fischl & Rauch, 2007b; Ochsner, Beer, Roberston, Cooper, Gabrielli, Kihlstrom & 
D’Esposito, 2005).  It is important to remember, however, that an animal’s experience of 
emotion is fundamentally different than a human’s primarily because the latter has far more 
developed means of explicitly storing, recognizing, manipulating, and physically and verbally 
communicating cognitive and emotional information.  It is important to stress the capacity of 
human language, in addition to associative learning, as one that can profoundly and 
unmistakably alter emotional perception (Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron, 2007).  Since language 
has to be learned, it may be thought of as ontogenetic phenomenon that may allow humans more 
emotional flexibility than animals that only learn by forming and altering stimulus-response 
associations.  At least in some respects, the existence of human language may allow for a greater 
ontogenetic/phylogenetic emotion dichotomy than for animals.   
In an imaging study, Phelps, O’Connor, Gatenby, Gore, Grillon, & Davis (2001) explain 
that “the primary adaptive function of emotion is to influence future interactions with stimuli 
associated with emotional reactions” (p. 437).  The study goes on to show how the brain 
responds in a way that relates to how a particular emotional response to a FR stimulus was 
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encoded.  Specifically, the study found that left amygdala activity is most strongly correlated 
with fear that is non-experimental or imagined, such as after participants were told that an 
unpleasant electrical shock would follow a certain stimulus.  Experimentally conditioned fear, on 
the other hand, was found to activate the right amygdala more significantly.  In addition to 
demonstrating the neuroanatomical laterality with the fear response, the study explains that fear 
may be a more multi-dimensional process in humans than in animals partly because of the 
unique ability of language that allows humans to formulate cognitive representations of an 
aversive stimulus without the need of fear conditioning interactions.  Furthermore, the study 
demonstrates how the imagined fear response shares certain symptoms with implicit fear 
responses as they both lead to a heightened skin conductance response.  As a final note, the study 
suggests that the left amygdala is involved in the conscious expression of the fear response when 
a FR situation or stimulus is encountered and that the insular cortex is involved in conveying 
these explicit representations of fear to the amygdala.  In another study, the insular cortex has 
been more correlated with disgust than fear (Stark, Zimmermann, Kagerer, Schienle, Walter, 
Weygandt, & Vaitl, 2007). 
  It is understandable that the neuroanatomical correlates of fear are shared with other 
arousing states such as disgust and stress.  Even erotic pictures have been shown to activate some 
of the same amygdalar regions as FR stimuli (Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons & Lang, 2005).  
A study which investigates the startle reflex in phobic patients concludes that the anterior insular 
cortex, often associated with disgust, is involved with the anticipation of aversive events (Wendt, 
Lotze, Weike, Hosten, & Hamm, 2008).  A meta-analysis study reinforces the notion that no 
specific brain region can be designated as the origin of a particular emotion (Phan, Wager, 
Taylor & Liberzon, 2002).  This study goes on to show how medial prefrontal cortex and nearby 
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aCC activity is present throughout basically all instances of conscious emotional processing.  To 
further highlight the phenomenon of functional neuroanatomical overlap, the Phelps et al. (2001) 
study also shows how both fear and disgust relevant stimuli are found to induce activity in the 
premotor cortex, striatum, and aCC.  Activity in the premotor cortex and striatum seems to be 
related to the autonomic fight or flight response that is associated with the anticipation of an 
impending electrical shock and that, along with other physiological responses, is correlated with 
an increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, and the breakdown of glycogen stores in the 
skeletal muscles (Freeman, 2008).  Activity in the third region, the aCC, has been correlated with 
emotional processing and the “weapons-focus effect” of FR (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton & 
Schacter, 2007; Waring, Payne, Schacter & Kensinger, submitted).  Although none of these 
regions are only associated with the response to FR stimuli, it appears that this network often is 
engaged during the presentation of such stimuli.  While it is not possible to deduce from the 
brain’s activity that a person is in a state of fear, it does appear that there are a number of regions 
whose activity is enhanced during the experience of fear – or other high-arousal – affective 
states.  
Positive emotion has proven even more difficult to neuroanatomically pinpoint than fear, 
but there has been significant progress in identifying those structures likely to show increased 
activity during a positive affective state.  For example, a study where participants watched videos 
of actors engaging in emotional interactions found that activity in the right middle temporal 
gyrus (MTG) was greater during happy rather than sad tape trials (Prohovnik et al., 2004).  
Previous studies have shown that temporal gyrus activity is correlated with perceptual and 
cognitive processing related to emotion (Rudebeck, Bannerman & Rushworth, 2008).  The 
cuneus, an area of the visual cortex, was also more active during happy tape trials.  As an 
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interesting side note, the cuneus and MTG are also interrelated in that they both become active 
during tasks that promulgate the detection of motion (Prohovnik et al., 2004).  Perhaps the slight 
detection of maxillofacial motion and body language, such as when a person is smiled at, is 
necessary in order to sympathize with their joy.   
A previously cited meta-analysis of emotion-related neuroimaging studies explains how 
the amygdala may be implicated across a wider range of emotion than was previously imagined 
as relatively recent findings suggest that heightened activity may reflect heightened emotional 
importance, arousal, or salience with little correlation to valence (Phan et al., 2002).  The study 
also shows that joy or positive valence has been associated with the basal ganglia regions 
including the ventral striatum and putamen.  Partly because they are replete with dopaminergic 
neurons, these regions have been thought to be implicated with the pleasurable effects that 
motivate a subject to persist with a certain behavior that is perceived as an ultimate end.  Joy and 
happiness are often described as “approach emotions” for this reason (Phan et al., 2002).  As 
with positive-emotion, disgust has also been correlated with basal ganglia activation (Phan et al., 
2002).  With this in mind, one can perceive the broader role of the basal ganglia as a 
motivational center that, through pleasure or pain, compels the organism to behave in a certain 
way in response to a stimulus, whether pleasant or unpleasant.  Basal ganglia activity is 
correlated with the appropriate motor responses to positive stimuli that could include smiling for 
instance (Phan et al., 2002).    
Based on the readings outlined above, I considered the key regions that are implicated in 
fear-relevant processing to be the premotor cortex, anterior insula, and amygdala; the main 
regions implicated in positive-emotion processing to be the MTG, visual cortex, ventral striatum, 
and putamen; and the regions implicated in both to be the basal ganglia, orbitofrontal cortex and 
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aCC.  This division is almost certainly a simplification of the complex tie between neural activity 
and emotional reaction, but the extant data also suggests at least some distinction among these 
regions in terms of their ties to different types of emotions. The goal of the present study was to 
examine whether activity within these regions would differ as a function of whether the emotion-
evoking stimuli were phylogenetic or ontogenetic.  I hypothesized is that there would be 
significant disparate neural activity between ontogenetic fear (OF) and phylogenetic fear (PF) as 
well as ontogenetic positive emotion (OP) and phylogenetic positive emotion (PP).  In the first 
part of the analysis, ontogenetic versus phylogenetic FR activity was looked at specifically since 
it has been the subject of most studies contrasting innate with conditioned emotion.  In the 
second part of the analysis, a broader investigation of ontogenetic versus phylogenetic emotional 
activity was conducted by combining FR with PR fMRI activity within each category.   
The results from the first part of the analysis are predicted to be similar to those from the 
second: ontogenetic stimuli will stimulate more aCC, OFC, temporal gyrus, and basolateral 
amygdala regions that have been related to conditioning, associative learning, and emotion 
regulation while phylogenetic stimuli will preferentially stimulate the insula and more ancient 
regions of the sensory cortices, remaining portions of the amygdala, and basal ganglia.  
However, the first part of the analysis may see more amygdala and insula activity than the 
second since these regions have been more frequently implicated with negative valence than 
emotion in general.  
 
Method 
Participants 
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Data from twenty-nine young participants (12 male and 17 female; ages 18-35) from two 
prior experiments (14 from Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; 15 from Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2008) were used in this experiment.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and all were screened to exclude those with a history of neurological trauma or 
psychiatric disorder.  No participant reported that he or she was taking any centrally acting 
medications.  Informed consent was obtained from all participants in a method approved by the 
Harvard University, Boston College, and Massachusetts General Hospital Institutional Review 
Boards.   
Materials and procedure  
Materials comprised colored, nameable photo objects (Hemera Technologies, 2002, 
Canada).  Images were shown on a white background and were formatted using PicStationX so 
that there were 300 pixels in their longest dimension.  Young adults rated objects on 9-point 
Likert scales for valence (with low numbers signifying negative objects and high numbers 
signifying positive objects) and arousal (with high numbers indicating high arousal).  Objects 
were included in this study if they had been judged by young adults to be negative and arousing 
(valence ratings of less than 3.5 and arousal ratings of greater than 5), positive and arousing 
(valence ratings greater than 5.5 and arousal ratings greater than 5), or neutral and nonarousing 
(valence ranging between 3 and 6 and arousal less than 5). Objects were chosen so that the 
positive and negative items differed significantly from the neutral items in both valence and 
arousal (p < .001) and so that positive and negative items were of comparable arousal level (p > 
.25).  
Negative arousing, positive arousing, and nonarousing neutral images from the Kensinger 
& Schacter (2007) and Kensinger et al. (2008) studies were reclassified as either PF, OF, PP, or 
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OP. Phylogenetic pictures tended to include natural, organic objects while ontogenetic pictures 
tended to include man-made, non-living objects.  To control for brain activity that might differ in 
response to these categorical differences, neutral objects were also classified into phylogenetic 
(PN) and ontogenetic (ON), with PN defined as objects that were natural and nonarousing while 
ON defined as objects that were man-made and nonarousing.  If the reclassification of certain 
objects proved too ambiguous, these objects were omitted from analysis. 209 out of the total 592 
objects used across the studies could be classified, and so analyses are restricted to this subset of 
items (Figure 2).   
Study procedure 
 While in the fMRI scanner, participants of the Kensinger et al. (2007) study were 
presented with a total of 304 nameable, colored objects.  These objects were presented across 
four lists, with each list containing 76 items (half negative, half neutral).  Each item was 
presented for 1 sec.  For half of the items, participants made a size decision about whether each 
object, in the real world, would fit inside a filing cabinet drawer.  For the other half of the 
objects, participants decided whether the object was a living thing.  Participants were cued as to 
which decision to make by the prompts “Living?” or “Fit?”  These prompts appeared above the 
object.  Participants were asked to make their decision as quickly as possible.  There were no 
reaction time differences in the time it took participants to make the decision for the negative and 
neutral objects.  Following the item’s presentation, a fixation cross (+) was presented for a 
variable duration (range of 5–13 sec) to provide jitter (Dale 1999).  The Kensinger & Schacter 
study (2008) shares identical features except that participants were presented with 324 nameable, 
colored objects across three lists, each containing 108 items (36 negative, 36 positive, 36 
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neutral).  Also, after viewing each object inside the fMRI scanner, participants only had to make 
the judgment as to whether it could fit in a filing cabinet (Figure 1).    
 
      
Figure 1.  Task design.  Participants viewed a series of photo objects and judged whether each would fit inside a file 
cabinet drawer (figure from Kensinger & Schacter, 2008; methods of Kensinger et al., 2007 were comparable, 
except that participants sometimes made a size decision and sometimes made a rating as to whether the item was 
living).  
 
Image Acquisition  
In the Kensinger et al. study (2007), images were acquired on a 3.0 Tesla Siemens 
Allegra MRI scanner. Detailed anatomic data were acquired using a multiplanar rapidly acquired 
gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence. Functional images were acquired using a T2*- weighted 
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2000msec, TE = 30 msec, FOV = 200 mm; flip angle 
= 90°).  Twenty-eight axial–oblique slices (3.2 mm thickness, 0.6 mm skip between slices), 
aligned along the anterior commissure/posterior commissure line, were acquired in an 
interleaved fashion.  These specifications are identical in the Kensinger & Schacter (2008) 
except that TR = 3000msec. 
Data Analysis 
Preprocessing and data analysis for all data were conducted within SPM2 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology). Standard preprocessing was performed on the functional 
Phylogenetic vs. Ontogenetic Emotion 
 
15 
data, including slice-timing correction, rigidbody motion correction, normalization to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute template (resampling at  2 mm
3
 voxels), and spatial smoothing 
(using a 7.6-mm fullwidth half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel).  
As noted previously, six different types of events were specified for each participant: PF, 
OF, PP, OP, PN, and ON.  For each and every participant, and on a voxel-by-voxel basis, an 
event-related analysis was conducted in which all instances of a particular event type were 
modeled through convolution with a canonical hemodynamic response function.   Effects for 
each event type were estimated using a subject-specific, fixed effects model.   
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of photo objects (6 examples) 
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These data were then entered into a second-level, random-effects group analysis.  These 
random-effects contrast analyses were conducted using the paired-samples t test function within 
SPM2, and they compared the activity for phylogenetic and ontogenetic stimuli (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  Description of second-order random effects analysis contrasts conducted 
Name Contrast Description 
C1O 
OF-PF>ON-
PN 
Brain activity greater for ontogenetic fear compared to phylogenetic 
fear, but not responding disproportionally to man-made, neutral 
objects. 
C1P 
PF-OF>PN-
ON 
Brain activity greater for phylogenetic fear compared to ontogenetic 
fear, but not responding disproportionally to natural, neutral objects 
or animals. 
C5O 
(OF+OP)-
(PF+PP)>ON-
PN 
Brain activity greater for ontogenetic emotion compared to 
phylogenetic emotion, but not responding disproportionately to man-
made, neutral objects. 
C5P 
(PF+PP)-
(OF+OP)>ON-
PN 
Brain activity greater for phylogenetic emotion compared to 
ontogenetic emotion, but not responding disproportionally to natural, 
neutral objects. 
 
*The neutral baseline conditions (ON-PN or PN-ON) were necessary in order to control for the fact that 
phylogenetic pictures tended to include a larger proportion of natural objects while ontological pictures tended to 
include a larger proportion of man-made objects. 
   
Group comparison analyses were conducted with a p < .005 and 5-voxel extent threshold. 
All activations are presented in neurological coordinates (i.e., activity on the right hemisphere is 
presented on the right side of the brain images).  To characterize pattern of activity for fear, 
regions of interest (ROIs) were created that included all significant voxels within a 5-mm radius 
of two relevant areas, one taken from group comparison analysis C1O and the other from CIP 
(using the ROI toolbox implemented in MarsBar; Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  
The hemodynamic time course for each individual participant and for each condition type 
(relative to fixation baseline) as a function of peristimulus time (0–21 sec) was then extracted. 
Statistics were performed on the sum of the signal changes occurring between 3 sec and 12 sec 
Phylogenetic vs. Ontogenetic Emotion 
 
17 
poststimulus onset. The sum of signal change values are displayed in the figures (Figure 3, 
Figure 4).  Voxel coordinates are reported in both MNI coordinates (as reported in SPM2) and 
Talairach coordinates (from Talairach and Tournoux, 1988); these coordinates reflect the most 
significant voxel within a cluster of activation.   
 
Results        
Behavioral results 
 Valence and arousal scores, as reported by participants, were analyzed in order to 
determine whether the ratings of objects depended on their ontogenetic or phylogenetic 
significance. Means and their standard errors were obtained and are listed in Table 2.  When 
directly contrasting OF to PF, OP to PP, or ON to PN stimuli, there was no difference as a 
function of whether the stimuli were ontogenetic or phylogenetic (p > .15),   The results indicate 
that valence and arousal means are similar across subtype conjugate pairs.  
Table 2.  Average valence and arousal ratings across event types.   
 OF  PF  OP  PP  ON  PN  
 valence Arousal valence arousal valence arousal valence arousal valence Arousal valence arousal 
Mean 2.31 6.76 2.25 6.68 6.61 6.71 6.64 6.62 5.05 3.92 4.95 3.95 
SE 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 
p > x 0.46 0.28 0.46 0.28 0.62 0.16 0.62 0.16 0.23 0.67 0.23 0.67 
 
 Reaction times were recorded in order to assure that there were no significant disparities 
across event types.  Within each event subtype, means and standard errors were computed and t 
tests were run to determine p values between corresponding phylogenetic and ontogenetic event 
types.  Comparable means and large p values from t tests (all p > .5) confirm the absence of 
processing speed biases between ontogenetic or phylogenetic event subtypes.   
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Table 3.  Comparison of reaction time (sec) means across event types.  
 OF PF OP PP ON PN 
Mean 2.05 2.07 2.00 1.95 2.00 1.98 
SE 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 
p > x 0.78 0.78 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.73 
 
 
 In conclusion, the ontogenetic or phylogenetic nature of stimuli within event types did 
not seem to disproportionately affect their valence scores, arousal scores, or reaction times. 
 
fMRI results  
Analyses were conducted to identify regions that responded to ontogenetic fear stimuli 
but not phylogenetic fear stimuli (C1O) as well as phylogenetic fear stimuli but not ontogenetic 
fear stimuli (C1P).  More generally, regions that became active for emotions of assumed 
ontogenetic origin, including both fear and positive emotion, were contrasted against emotions of 
assumed phylogenetic origin (C5O), and visa versa (C5P).  The C5 contrasts were conducted in 
order to see whether the activation patterns revealed for fear specifically would also hold up for 
emotion processing in general.  Thus, the fear-relevant stimuli used in C1O and C1P were 
expanded to include both fear-relevant and positive emotion-relevant stimuli in C5O and C5P 
(Table 1).  
The purpose of C1O is to differentiate neural activity that is greater for ontogenetic fear 
compared to phylogenetic fear, but that does not respond disproportionally to man-made, neutral 
objects.  The most significant area of activity in this contrast (p<0.0001), and in this study, 
includes a large region (73 voxels) in the left aCC that spread laterally to the OFC (Figure 3; 
Talairach coordinates -16, 39, -2).  Initially, it seems possible that there is a unilateral bias since 
only the left aCC demonstrates significant activity, but after increasing the p-value threshold 
(p<.003), significant right aCC activity is also observed.  Right PFC activity was also observed, 
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but it was more dorsal than left PFC activity.  In conclusion, bilateral PFC and aCC activity is 
observed for ontogenetic fear in comparison to phylogenetic fear (Table 4: C1O). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  OFC/aCC region (Talairach coordinates -16, 39, -2) activated more strongly after the presentation 
of ontogenetic but not phylogenetic fear stimuli.  The graph (right) reveals that the ontogenetic/phylogenetic 
discrepancy in this region also occurs with positive emotion stimuli. 
 
C1P, the inverse of the previous contrast, was conducted to distinguish those brain 
regions that exhibit greater activity for phylogenetic fear compared to ontogenetic fear, but not 
responding to neutral natural objects or animals.  In this case, a specific area of activity in the 
lingual gyrus is observed (p< 0.002), and a region of interest analysis was conducted in this 
region (Figure 4; Talairach coordinates -2,-70,-12).  It is interesting that there is much less 
activity revealed in this contrast in comparison to the C1O: Phylogenetic fear objects only elicit a 
small area of activity in the lingual gyrus of the visual cortex, while ontogenetic fears show 
widespread, robust, and bilateral activity in the PFC (Table 4: C1P). 
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Figure 4.  A lingual gyrus region (Talairach coordinates -2, -70, -12) activated more strongly after the 
presentation of phylogenetic, but not ontogenetic, fear stimuli.   The graph (right) reveals that the 
phylogenetic/ontogenetic discrepancy in this region also occurs with positive emotion stimuli. 
 
C5O was set up to highlight neural activity that is greater for ontogenetic emotion 
compared to phylogenetic emotion, but that does not respond disproportionately to neutral, man-
made objects.  Activity resembles that of C1O, with the aCC and left frontal gyrus of the OFC 
showing significant activation (Figure 5; Talairach coordinates -16, 39, -2).  Right thalamus and 
medial cerebellum activity is also present.  Also unlike C1O, C5O showed only significant left 
cortical activity and no significant right cortical activity at a specific threshold (p< .005).  In 
summary, ontogenetic emotion, in contrast to phylogenetic emotion, seems be supported by 
widespread OFC and aCC activity (Table 4; C5O).  
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Figure 5.  OFC/aCC region (Talairach coordinates -16, 39, -2) activated more strongly after the 
presentation of ontogenetic, but not phylogenetic, fear + positive emotion stimuli. 
 
 
A final contrast, C5P, was set up as an inverse of C5O to determine what brain activity is 
greater for phylogenetic emotion compared to ontogenetic emotion, but is not disproportionately 
strong for neutral natural objects and animals.  Three significant activity clusters are discovered 
in the basal ganglia: two in the right putamen (Figure 6; Talairach coordinates 22, 5, 15 and 24, 
8, 5) and one in the left dorsal, globus pallidus of the striatum.  In addition, right fusiform gyrus 
activity is present (Figure 6; Talairach coordinates 40, -57, -9).  It seems that phylogenetic 
emotional stimuli stimulate basal ganglia regions and not frontal cortical regions, in contrast to 
ontogenetic emotional stimuli (Table 4; C5P). 
            
Figure 6.  Fusiform gyrus (depicted in yellow; Talairach coordinates 40, -57, -9) and putamen areas 
(depicted in red; Talairach coordinates  22, 5, 15 and 24, 8, 5) activated more strongly after the 
presentation of ontogenetic, but not phylogenetic, fear + positive emotion stimuli. 
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Given that each of these four contrasts demonstrates at least some significant brain 
activity, it can be concluded with some confidence that the initial hypothesis was correct: 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic emotions do draw upon disparate brain regions.  
 
Table 4.  Regions of activity specific to each of four contrasts. 
Contrast MNI 
Coordinates Talairach  
Voxel 
Extent  Region Brodmann p < x 
 X Y Z X Y Z   Area  
C1O = OF-
PF>ON-PN -16 40 8 -15.84 38.75 -1.94 73 
Left Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex 32 0.0001 
 
       
Left Medial Frontal 
Gyrus   
 
-2 24 4 -1.98 23.44 2.51 14 
Left Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex 24 0.002 
20 48 0 19.80 46.50 -2.33 38 
Right Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex   32 and10 0.001 
 
16 62 4 15.84 60.25 0.67 21 
Right Superior 
Frontal Gyrus 11 0.001 
           
C1P = PF-
OF>PN-ON -2 -72 -10 -1.98 69.33 -11.88 15 
Lingual Gyrus 
18 0.002 
           
C5O = 
(OF+OP)-
(PF+PP)>ON-
PN 
-16 40 8 -15.84 38.75 -1.94 36 
Subgenual 
Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
32 0.001 
 
-22 36 -6 -21.78 34.62 -6.78 36 
Left Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus 47 0.002 
 
18 -24 16 17.82 -22.52 15.87 11 
Right Thalamus 
 0.001 
 0 -36 -28 0.00 -36.05 -21.75 7 Medial Cerebellum  0.002 
 
-44 -42 10 -43.56 -40.23 11.23 10 
Left Superior 
Temporal Gyrus 41 0.002 
           
C5P = (PF+PP)-
(OF+OP)>ON-
PN 22 4 16 21.78 4.61 14.51 12 
Right Putamen 
 0.001 
 24 8 6 23.76 8.03 5.13 7 
Right Putamen 
 0.003 
 40 -58 -14 39.60 -56.78 -8.93 10 
Right Fusiform 
Gyrus  37 0.003 
 -22 -8 -8 -21.78 -8.09 -6.32 5 
Left Globus 
Pallidus (external)  0.003 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether emotions generated via ontogenetic 
or phylogenetic stimuli draw upon separate neural circuits by highlighting key brain regions that 
differ in these two conditions.  The results of this experiment provide evidence that distinct brain 
regions become active in response to ontogenetic versus phylogenetic emotion-relevant stimuli.    
In the case of fear, there is a clear shift from dispersed lateral PFC and anterior aCC activity 
during OF to less robust activity focused on a specific spot on the lingual gyrus during the 
presentation of PF stimuli.   For emotion in general, a related shift from frontal cortical regions 
corresponding to ontological emotion to deeper basal ganglia and visual regions corresponding to 
phylogenetic emotion is detected. 
        
Fear   
The goal of my first contrast was to distinguish those brain regions that respond to 
ontogenetic fear stimuli but not to fearful stimuli of phylogenetic origin.  The finding that 
bilateral aCC and OFC activity is specific to ontogenetic fear but not phylogenetic fear (Figure 
3) is consistent with previous studies that have implicated these regions as having roles in the 
conditioned fear response to a specific conditioned stimulus (Alvarez et al., 2008) as well as to a 
general fear-relevant context (Alvarez et al., 2008).  In the Alvarez et al. (2008) study, the 
subgenual aCC and posterior OFC were implicated with contextual fear conditioning (as well 
some regions in the medial temporal lope) as participants navigated through a virtual 
environment previously associated with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (an electric shock to 
the foot).  A path analysis within the Alvarez study (2008) revealed that the OFC may have the 
role of relaying potential threat information to the amygdala.  It also served to highlight the role 
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of the subgenual aCC in modulating contextual fear.  Another study has linked the more dorsal 
portion of the aCC, which is also active in this contrast, to the managing of fear expressions to 
specific fear objects, but not to broader fear relevant environmental contexts (Milad et al., 
2007b).  These studies, as well as others, provide evidence that the aCC and OFC are involved in 
the processing of previously learned, or ontogenetic, fears.  The many afferent and efferent 
connections from the aCC and OFC to the amygdala (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007) and 
striatum of the basal ganglia (Haber et al., 2006) may allow for the application of previous fear 
learning to the situation at hand in order develop a proper cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
response.   
But such a dynamic neural system may not be necessary for the experience of more hard-
wired, phylogenetic fear, which would explain the absence of prefrontal cortex activity in this 
case.  Instead, activity specific to phylogenetic fear is concentrated in a sole spot on the lingual 
gyrus of the visual cortex.  This region has been implicated most frequently with cortical 
processing of visual stimuli, especially with complex perception (Haxby, Grady, Horwitz, 
Ungerleider, Mishkin et al., 1991; Sergent, Ohta & MacDonald, 1992) such as word recognition 
regardless of font or size (Borowsky, Esopenko, Cummine & Sarty, 2007).  A positron emission 
tomography study has shown that the lingual gyrus comes more active during the recognition of 
negative images compared to neutral images (Taylor, Liberzon, Fig, Decker, Minoshima & 
Koeppe, 1998).  This indicates that emotional stimuli can enhance the processing of visual 
information and recognition.  It has been suggested that this enhanced visual processing occurs 
when the amygdala potentiates the visual cortex, as highlighted by the fact that healthy 
individuals, but not those with amygdala lesions, show enhanced visual cortex response to 
fearful compared to neutral faces (Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2004).  
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The present results suggest that the connections from the amygdala to the visual cortex may be 
genetically hardwired and may not be affected by experience, leading the lingual gyrus to 
respond to fears that are present at birth, or to phylogenetic fear stimuli, but not to neutral or 
ontogenetic fear stimuli.    
           My results (Table 4; C1O, C1P) suggest that a neural representation of phylogenetic fear 
relevant stimuli relies heavily on activity in the visual area while relying minimally on frontal 
cognitive reserves.  Thus, evolutionary fears might be more efficiently processed than learned 
fears by relying less on prefrontal regions that have been linked to memory retrieval and to 
higher cognitive functions and instead relying on sensory processes which may become active as 
soon as a phylogenetically relevant fearful object is visually detected, independent of conscious 
attention and awareness (Pessoa, Japee & Ungerleider, 2005).   
With the enhanced processing of fearful stimuli occurring as early as the sensory 
perception stage, one can deduce that the “preparedness hypothesis” (Seligman, 1971), which 
states that biological predispositions allow for faster learning, can be supported, at least in part, 
because of enhanced and modulated sensory processing for phylogenetic fear stimuli.  The 
preparedness hypothesis has also been substantiated by event related potential studies which 
have found that phylogenetic FR stimuli are processed more quickly than their ontogenetic 
counterparts (Ohman & Mineka, 2001).  The amygdala’s tendency to enhance the processing of 
ontogenetic fearful stimuli in the visual cortex helps to explain why the majority of phobias are 
based on a fear of natural, or phylogenetic, phenomena or objects (Mühlberger et al., 2006).   
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Nature vs. Nurture: Emotion     
Although analyzing the neural substrates of fear in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic contexts 
has been a main focus of this study, a broader and loftier aim is to find evidence for the existence 
of individual brain regions and circuits that underscore the phylogenetic or ontogenetic 
emotional experience in general.   With this in mind, positive emotion–relevant events were 
included with fear relevant events in the last two group contrasts in order to point out nature vs. 
nurture discrepancies that apply to emotion in general.  The results of these last two contrasts 
(Table 4; C5O, C5P) seem to point to a central conclusion: that activity in the left aCC, OFC, 
and other cortical regions is more closely related to the experience of ontogenetic emotion while 
activity in the basal ganglia and visual regions is most closely related to the experience of 
phylogenetic emotion.    
Ontogenetic emotion, but not phylogenetic emotion, is associated with activity in the 
following regions in the left cerebral cortex: the inferior frontal gyrus, subgenual aCC, and 
adjacent superior temporal gyrus.   
The inferior frontal gyrus, and OFC more broadly, have been implicated in top down 
regulation of the insula after the presentation of emotional faces (Jabbi & Keysers, 2008), as well 
as top-down regulation of the amygdala (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007) and striatum of the 
basal ganglia (Haber et al., 2006).  As a result of its regulation of other emotional centers, there 
is much literature to support the claim that OFC activity is largely responsible for reward guided 
behavior and decision making (Rudebeck et al., 2008) that would include the processing of 
positive emotion relevant stimuli.  Furthermore, OFC lesions have been associated with 
emotional disregulation and aggression in animals (Izquierdo et al., 2005; Machado & 
Bachevalier, 2006).  In humans, the OFC seems to be implicated with the conscious regulation of 
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emotions (Damasio, 1994; Rolls,
 
1999; Davidson et al., 2000; Ochsner et al., 2005) and, as with 
animals, the
 
regulation of social and emotional behavior (Bullock & Polkey, 2003;
 
Hermann, 
Lotze, Grodd & Birbaumer, 2002; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2003; Rolls, Hornak, Wade & 
McGrath, 1994).  Furthermore, the OFC is in a position to be an early modulator of ontogenetic 
emotional information as it receives input from almost all of the sensory systems (Rudebeck et 
al., 2008).    
The ontogenetic emotional input that flows into the aCC, however, probably does not do 
so directly from sensory regions, but rather through the OFC since the OFC receives a multitude 
of visual inputs from the inferior temporal and perirhinal cortex and is connected with the aCC 
which, in contrast, receives only limited sensory inputs (Rudebeck et al., 2008).  Subgenual aCC 
activity, as was mentioned earlier, has been implicated with the regulation of the fear response 
(Milad et al., 2007).  The aCC may also have roles involving motivation and the modulation of 
affect in general, as has been shown by various researchers (Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz & 
Davidson, 1997; Phan et al., 2002).  The results of this study indicate that the regulatory role of 
the aCC and OFC may be most applicable to learned or ontogenetic emotions than to 
phylogenetic emotions which do not have to be acquired through associative learning.  It is 
possible that phylogenetic emotion, however, is largely outside the influence of aCC and OFC 
regulation as these regions are less active as a result of phylogenetic rather than ontogenetic 
emotional stimuli.     
Connections between the aCC and discrete parts to the temporal lobe have also been 
noted in literature (Rudebeck et. al., 2008).  As a result, it is possible that aCC regulation of 
ontogenetic emotion may, at least in part, be substantiated by aCC excitatory regulation of the 
superior temporal gyrus during the presentation of the ontogenetic emotional stimuli of this 
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study.  The superior temporal gyrus may, in turn, receive a bulk of its sensory input, that is 
upregulated or excited by the aCC, from the inferior temporal cortex (Rudebeck et. al., 2008).  
Furthermore, such temporal gyrus activity has been previously associated with evolutionarily 
socially meaningful information, such as faces and vocalizations, and could itself play a crucial 
role in modulating emotional and social behavior (Rudebeck et. al., 2008).   
Granted that ontogenetic emotional associations, as processed in the OFC, aCC, and 
superior temporal gyrus, served the ancestral person by helping him/her form beneficial relations 
with others as well as to communicate and respond to novel threats (Turner, 2000), one can see 
why the aCC, OFC, and superior temporal gyrus activate after ontogenetic emotional stimuli in 
this study.  This scenario exemplifies a possible way that nurture may work via nature: conscious 
and unconscious emotional processing in cortical regions will modify subsequent emotional 
processing, cognition, and behavior by interacting with the emotional and motor regions of the 
amygdala, basal ganglia, and cerebellum.  These regions will, thenceforth, show strong activity 
after the presentation of relevant ontogenetic stimuli. 
Thalamus activation as a result of ontogenetic but not phylogenetic emotional stimuli 
does not come unexpected since this region is often referred to as the “gateway to the cortex” 
(McAlonan, Cavanaugh & Wurtz, 2008).  It is possible that the increased left cortical processing 
of ontogenetic fear stimuli is only made possible through increased right thalamic activity, as the 
existence of contralateral, or opposite-side, connections from the thalamus to the cortex has 
already been established (Dermon & Barbas, 1994)   
 The final group contrast of this study was carried out to highlight those areas that respond 
to phylogenetic but not ontogenetic emotional stimuli.  These areas included right basal ganglia 
regions -- the globus pallidus and putamen – and the fusiform gyrus.    
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Lesions in the basal ganglia usually lead to motor impairment and blunting of affective 
responses, as is the case with Parkinson’s disease patients (Bowers, Miller, Mikos, Kirsch-
Darrow, Springer, Fernandez, Foote & Okun, 2006).  As a result, these regions seem necessary 
for the persistence of “normal affect” and its subsequent effect on motor response.  In addition, 
these areas share close ties with the amygdala and OFC, the latter which top-down regulates both 
the basal ganglia and amygdala (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Haber et al., 2006).  In this 
study, the relatively high putamen and globus pallidus activity after the presentation of 
phylogenetic emotional stimuli (Table 4; C5P) might result from a relative lack of OFC 
inhibitory regulation.  There may be biological benefits to these regions being minimally 
susceptible to cognitive inhibition during special circumstances.   Such context-specific, bottom-
up hardwiring would have stood the test of natural selection as it consistently drove humans to 
flee from predators, attain food, mate, rear young, and seek relations with friendly neighbors.  
Enhanced activity in the fusiform gyrus as a result of amygdala excitation may have also 
stood the test of natural selection as it contributed to the crucial processing of emotional facial 
expressions (Morris, Friston, Buchel, Frith, Young, Calder & Dolan, 1998).  More broadly, 
increased visual cortical activity in the fusiform and lingual gyri (chart; Figure 4) after amygdala 
feedback (Vuilleumier et al., 2004) possibly shows how the brain prioritizes the use of its 
resources towards processing phylogenetic relevant stimuli.  In conclusion, it seems that natural 
selection has favored enhanced visual processing of phylogenetic emotion-relevant stimuli but 
not ontogenetic emotion-relevant stimuli.   
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Because the amygdala has often been implicated with arousal and the fear response 
across numerous studies (Alvarez et al., 2008; LaBar,Gatenby,Gore, LeDoux,& Phelps, 1998) it 
is necessary to explain why, even at the lowest activity threshold used in this study (p<0.005), no 
amygdala activity was detected during any of the group contrasts including the fear-specific 
ones. 
The absence of amygdala activity in my contrasts could be due to equal activation of the 
amygdala during the presentation of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic relevant stimuli.  Some 
neuroscientists believe that the amygdala is not involved primarily with fear but instead, more 
broadly with arousal (Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002; Hamann & Mao, 2002; Ohman, 
1986).  Since the contrasts of this study are designed to produce differences in activity between 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic stimuli, it is possible that equally arousing pictures across 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic event types, as is listed in my results (mean; Table 2), lead to 
comparable mean amygdala activity that did not show up in any of the group contrasts. 
In the future, region of interest analyses in the amygdala should be conducted to 
determine if there is really equal activation of the amygdala across ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
object presentations.   A region of interest analysis in this area may also be conducted to test for 
laterality effects.  Laterality effects for the processing of fear and arousal in the amygdala have 
already been the subject of numerous studies (Baas, Aleman & Kahn, 2004; Phelps et al., 2001), 
but none yet have inquired as to possible innate vs. learned fear literalities.   Phelps et al. (2001) 
came close by discovering a laterality effect for instructed vs. conditioned fears.  However, since 
both of these categories are placed under the umbrella of OF in this study, this would explain 
why no lateralized activity in the amygdala is reported in my results (Table 4).        
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As with the amygdala, an explanation for the absence of medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
activity is warranted, specifically during the presentation of ontogenetic but not phylogenetic 
emotional stimuli, since constituent areas like the hippocampus have been implicated with 
associative learning in humans (Alvarez et. al., 2008; Milad, Wright, Orr, Pitman, Quirk & 
Rauch, 2007a).  A study using fornix-transected
 
monkeys (the fornix, along with the fimbria, 
provides inputs to the hippocampus) suggests that the hippocampus comes active while the 
animal is learning new stimulus-response associations, but not during the retention or retrieval of 
previously learned associations (Brasted, Bussey, Murray & Wise, 2003).  Since this experiment 
uses pre-established and long-term consolidated fears, MTL regions like the hippocampus may 
no longer play a role during the presentation of emotionally relevant stimuli as associative 
information has already been moved to more long-term cortical regions. 
The results of this study also point to another area of inquiry: the role of hemispheric 
literalities in the experience of ontogenetic and phylogenetic emotion.  As is evident in the final 
two contrasts conducted (C5O, C5P; Table 4), all cortical activity related to ontogenetic emotion 
(fear + positive emotion) seems to be present in the left hemisphere of the brain, and basal 
ganglia activity related to phylogenetic emotion seems to be present in the right hemisphere.  
Paradoxically, in my first two contrasts, which only included fear (C1O and C1P; Table 4), 
activity was bilateral for both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic event types.  This may indicate 
that the perceived laterality effect in the C5O and C5P contrasts may simply result from the 
inclusion of positive emotional stimuli.  Providing support for this view, a meta-analysis of the 
functional neuroanatomy of emotions indicates that approach emotions, such as positive 
emotion, tend to be preferentially based in the left hemisphere, while negative emotions are more 
bilaterally represented (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith & Lawrence, 2003).  A future study would need 
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to be devised to determine if a laterality effect in fact exists, and if it does, to determine if it is 
based on emotional valence or ontogenetic/phylogenetic relevance.  Such a study would at least 
require contrasting PR activity by itself, as was the case with FR activity.   
Along with not looking at PR activity by itself, I believe there to be two other important 
shortcomings with this study.  For one, a conjunction analysis was not conducted to determine 
brain regions that respond to both ontogenetic and phylogenetic emotional stimuli.  The results 
of such an analysis would allow for nonbiased discussion as to the relative differences of 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic emotion circuits.  Finally, this experiment could improve by 
attaining its own fMRI data.   As a result, there would be more control over the selection of 
emotional stimuli.  Perhaps a conditioning paradigm with the use of an unconditioned stimulus 
such as a shock, for example, could be incorporated into the study to create stimulus-response 
pairings that would control for the origins of ontogenetic stimuli.       
 
Conclusion 
In an attempt to better understand the interplay of nature and nurture in the shaping of 
human emotions, the present study investigated possible ontogenetic and phylogenetic functional 
neuroanatomical discrepancies of fear and positive emotion.  The results suggest that the 
experience of ontogenetic and phylogenetic emotion may be fundamentally different as it is 
supported by distinct neural systems.  Ontogenetic emotion seems to be preferentially 
substantiated by activity in cortical regions located in the front of the brain that may allow for a 
more cognitive and plastic neural and behavioral response.  Phylogenetic emotion, on the other 
hand, seems to be less susceptible to top-down processing from cortical regions and more 
grounded in bottom-up processing that originates in sensory and basal ganglia regions.  The 
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prevalence of robust bottom-up networks for the processing of phylogenetic emotional stimuli 
may have proved advantageous for the survival of ancestral people.  At the same time, the 
prevalence of top-down networks which can be structured and restructured by experiences to 
encode new stimulus-emotional response associations could have proven useful for ancestral 
people facing ever-changing environmental and social situations.   
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